Zombies- A definitive conceivability argument

Zombies

First published Mon Sep 8, 2003; substantive revision Thu Mar 17, 2011

Zombies in philosophy are imaginary creatures used to illuminate problems about consciousness and its relation to the physical world. Unlike those in films or witchraft, they are exactly like us in all physical respects but without conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave just like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness.

Zombie walk Paris 2011
Image by mamasuco via Flickr

Few people think zombies actually exist. But many hold they are at least conceivable, and some that they are possible. It is argued that if zombies are so much as a bare possibility, then physicalism is false and some kind of dualism is true. For many philosophers that is the chief importance of the zombie idea. But the idea is also of interest for its presuppositions about the nature of consciousness and how the physical and the phenomenal are related. Use of the zombie idea against physicalism also raises more general questions about relations between imaginability, conceivability, and possibility. Finally, zombies raise epistemological difficulties: they reinstate the ‘other minds’ problem.

Read the complete papers here on Bloggo Schloggo page-
Zombies- A definitive conceivability argument (Complete Paper)”

From The Stanford University Encyclopedia Of Philosophy
©Metaphysics Research Lab,CSLI,Stanford University

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One thought on “Zombies- A definitive conceivability argument

  1. Pingback: Happy Halloween Exclusive- Macabre Treats From Bloggo | Bloggo Schloggo

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